And I say: There are at least two different senses of “knowledge” which you are equivocating on. I “know,” for instance, that Socrates was put to death by hemlock way back in the day. I also “know” that a bachelor is an unmarried male. The second sense of “know” means: without *any* chance of error. The first sense of “know” means: have overwhelming reason to believe. The two are not the same, Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff (and anyone who pretends to do philosophy) should “know” that, and apply the right standard in the right context. Doing otherwise is to commit the fallacy of context-dropping (or whatever new fallacy Rand decided to call it).

Hume believed that “knowledge” in the looser sense is possible with respect to non-analytic or tautological truths or facts. Hume did not believe that we had “knowledge” about empirical matters in the strictest possible sense of “to know,” where there is no chance of being wrong.

But Rand probably knew that, and Peikoff does know it (since he is a professional philosopher), and so I’m tempted by the oft-repeated criticism of Rand that she was being imprecise for the sake of a cheap, emotional point. Because to be absolutely precise is to have to take Kant and Hume much more seriously than she did, and to admit that *they have a persuasive case.*

So, to make myself perfectly clear: Knowledge is possible. Knowledge about the past will necessarily not be without *any* chance of error, similarly with knowledge about the future, and so, too, with knowledge that we derive directly from our senses. We are not omniscient, Paul. But we *can* have knowledge in the sense of having *overwhelming* reason to believe some proposition. That’s real, genuine, honest-to-goodness knowledge. So let’s not play the Randian equivocation game (she does this so often, it’s used as a humorous example in philosophy classes).

Then you wrote: “In any collaboration between two men (or two groups) who hold different basic principles, it is the more evil or irrational one who wins. (“The Anatomy of Compromise,” Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, 145.)”

And I challenge you to prove this statement without quoting Ayn Rand. Why? Because the case is flimsy. In fact, I claim that that statement is empirically without support either in the sense of there being an insufficient number of empirical cases to support it (and therefore it would be wrong for her to assert that she knows this rather than to say that she’s got this hypothesis about “evil” stuff having more “power” than “good” stuff bouncing around in her noggin’ and she’s just throwing it out there so that others can do some empirical work), or in the sense of it being literally false.

Interestingly, it’s a conjunction of 1. evil *and* 2. irrational. Proving a conjunction requires that it be true that 1. The more evil individual or group will win and it must *also* be true that 2. The more irrational individual or group will win. Since the latter proposition is false (depending on what Rand means by “irrational”… but I’ll get to that), the whole statement is false.

Why is it false? Because “rationality” in one sense means merely to take the right means to accomplish your goals. On this version, “irrationality” means taking the wrong means to accomplish your goals (whatever they happen to be). For instance, if you want to count all the blades of grass on your front lawn, it would be irrational for you to grow corn on the assumption that the number of corn stalks will be directly proportional to the number of blades of grass on your front lawn if you multiply by a factor of 10. Thus, in any battle between good and evil, the “irrational” will lose, except by accident. Because they’ll be busy talking about lettuce when they want to move their feet, say, or eat telephones.

In the sense that Rand probably means, it is probably false as well. Surely one thing (amongst many others) going for being rational is that you can defeat “evil.” Surely we’d like to think, if we’re Randians, that in a battle between the rational man and the irrational man, the rational man will win out (one-on-one).

Finally, if it’s a *collaboration* (to achieve goal Y, say), then *they both win*. They *both* get Y. So suppose we want liberty, but you want it because of a (false) belief about the teleological nature of man (Rand either didn’t read enough, or didn’t understand, evolutionary theory), or you want it because of a (false) belief in God, and I want it because it leads to good outcomes (say). And suppose we collaborate (meaning: “work together on some particular goal,” where “goal,” in this case, means “get liberty”), and suppose that the goal we collaborate on is not the sort that only one of us can benefit from (as is the case with liberty), then the meaning of you “winning” in this case is you attaining the goal that we collaborated on. But that means that I won too, since I also get liberty!

It’s like she’s saying: if you’re on a soccer team, and you’re collaborating to score more goals, as a team, during the match, then that teammate of yours who is more evil or irrational will win. Uhm…

And Peter Schwartz’ article is a perfect example of an intellectually dishonest article. What kind of a libertarian you are makes a big difference. The Schwartz’ of the world see libertarians as one giant collective and then criticize that collective for holding different, and mutually exclusive views. But that’s like saying that ethical egoists hold inconsistent views, or that atheists hold inconsistent views. It may be true that this atheist (Ayn Rand, say), or that ethical egoist (Ayn Rand, say), does not hold inconsistent views, but when we compare Ayn Rand’s views on politics with Richard Dawkins views on politics, then–a ha!–we get an inconsistency, and then (by some magic) get to criticize Ayn Rand for being an atheist because atheists hold inconsistent views! But that is just utterly false.

Interestingly, Rand accepts the label “atheist” (why she doesn’t just insist that she’s not an “atheist”–because they don’t all reject faith or are atheists as a consequence of being thoroughly committed to reason–but an “objectivist” is beyond me), she also accepts “ethical egoist” (she could, likewise, insist on being called an “objectivist” because some ethical egoists will be Nietzschean-esque, and so inconsistent with her ethical views), but doesn’t accept “libertarian” which has the same genus function as “ethical egoist” and “atheist”.

It is *identical* to the fallacy Aristotle commits right off the bat in the very opening of the Nichomachean Ethics: “Every craft and every investigation and likewise every action and decision seems to aim at some good; hence, the good has been well-described as that at which everything aims.” (That’s the fallacy of composition).

Rand is wrong on this score, Paul. And wrong according to the demands of reason. Of course, no one is compelling you to be reasonable. (I suppose you’ll have the benefit of winning when you collaborate with the reasonable…)

I asked: “Can you name a speaker, or anything, for that matter, that doesn’t serve the ends of promoting liberty?”

And you wrote: “Peter Jaworski, libertarianism, and the Liberty Summer Seminar.”

And I say: I was never a speaker at the LSS. I only co-host the event, I don’t speak at it. And add that that’s a pretty harsh indictment of me, personally, and you really shouldn’t do it without knowing me better. You don’t know where I diverge with Objectivism, and I think even Rand would insist that you collect more evidence before you cast so harsh a judgment.

Peter, I have explained, at various times mentioned above, that libertarianism not only fails to promote freedom, but implicitly or explicitly (depending upon the libertarian, and the day) denies the necessity or relevance of a commitment to the facts of reality, to reason, or to objective morality in the promotion of freedom. You have as much as agreed with me without saying so, when you’ve said such things as this:

Libertarianism is broad and “lacks” foundations not because libertarians don’t hold foundational views that would exclude many others, but because the word “libertarian” applies to the conclusion of an argument, and not the argument itself.

As for my needing to know you better before making such an evaluation of your efforts: it is not as though you have not made your views amply known in writing and on your campus radio show. You have been a vocal advocate of libertarianism. Indeed, my understanding is that you just this weekend attended a Libertarian Party of Canada conference. Similarly, the Liberty Summer Seminar is a libertarian event hosted by you.

My argument (and that of Peter Schwartz, before me, in his “Libertarianism: The Perversion of Liberty”) is that Libertarianism does not “serve the ends of promoting liberty”. If you understand my argument, then you will understand my conclusion that it also follows:

1. that (such as the Liberty Summer Seminar) which promotes, advocates or sanctions libertarianism as a way of promoting liberty is not serving “the ends of promoting liberty”; and

2. those who (like yourself) promote, advocate, or sanction libertarianism as a way of promoting liberty are, similarly not serving “the ends of promoting liberty”.

You write:

…I’ve read every significant work Ayn Rand ever wrote. Every non-fiction book, and every work of fiction…

You asked: “…What do you think about Hume and skepticism?”…our senses are our only means of acquiring information about the external world, and so we’re stuck with the instruments we’ve got….We have better and worse reasons to accept the world-as-it-appears-to-me …But that’s all we have–better and worse reasons, not “knowledge,” strictly speaking.

Regrettably, then, you cannot claim to be ignorant, or accidentally wrong, in respect of that which you are promoting.

And you will be familiar with the fact that, in proposing that Objectivists get on board with those who believe knowledge to be impossible, you are – not ignorantly or accidentally – asking that that which leads logically to freedom work together with that which undermines it entirely.

In any collaboration between two men (or two groups) who hold different basic principles, it is the more evil or irrational one who wins. (“The Anatomy of Compromise,” Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, 145.)

a) duh and b) duh. You might know anarchists who consider themselves Objectivists, but I know Objectivists who think they know things that they don’t. A person truly committed to freedom looks at an invitation to the Liberty Summer Seminar and does what they can to attend.

And you wrote: “Peter Jaworski, libertarianism, and the Liberty Summer Seminar.”

And I say: I was never a speaker at the LSS. I only co-host the event, I don’t speak at it. And add that that’s a pretty harsh indictment of me, personally, and you really shouldn’t do it without knowing me better. You don’t know where I diverge with Objectivism, and I think even Rand would insist that you collect more evidence before you cast so harsh a judgment. I might say the same of you, Paul, since I think Objectivism is a poor way to promote liberty. Unless you think you know that I like Mozart. In which case I stand corrected–since knowing that someone thinks this or that thing is aesthetically pleasing is sufficient to judge their character… ahem…

You asked: “Tell me Peter. You are an intelligent guy. You have the capacity to read and understand Objectivism if you want to. You seem to imply that you have done the reading. What do you think about Hume and skepticism?”

And I say, 1. thanks!,
2. I’ve read every significant work Ayn Rand ever wrote. Every non-fiction book, and every work of fiction, including Night of January 16.
And 3. You’ll have to be more specific. What are we talking about, exactly? Is it Hume’s general point about the fact that we have to use our senses, that those are, of necessity, filters, that we don’t perceive the (what Kant called) “noumenal” world, but only phenomena? Or do you mean his point about causality, and our inability to “know” the future? Or do you mean Hume’s skepticism with respect to religion, the existence of a god or gods, and his argument against miracles? His skepticism with respect to metaphysics, and its usefulness in general (that is where the famous “condemn it then to the flames” quip comes from)? Or something else?

I’ll answer all of them, I guess, and going backwards: 4. Condemn it to the flames, I say! Largely stuff we shouldn’t bother with, akin to arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Not all of it, mind you, but large, large chunks of it.
3. Miracles? Nonsense. God? I don’t believe. The supernatural? Humbug.
2. Hume’s right. And he’s usually grossly misunderstood. He does not deny causality, merely our ability to “know” this. Kant’s response is to insist that cause and effect is a frame we must use in order to understand the world in the first place. Awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume (if only Objectivists could be so roused), Kant’s response is pretty good, in my mind. We might append it here and there, and insist, for instance, that we have every reason to use cause-and-effect reasoning as a justified and legitimate *assumption,* even though we can’t *know* this without faith (and faith is a bugaboo, Paul). Incidentally, and contrary to Rand’s and Peikoff’s bastardization of both Kant and Hume (one wonders if they ever bothered to actually read them), neither of them “condemn” us to uncertainty or undermine our ability to think or reason. It does not undermine “man’s mind.” All it does is admit a fact: There’s stuff we can’t know (although some of that stuff we have excellent reason to go on as an assumption).
1. Yup, Hume’s right about this as well. We can’t step outside of our heads, as it were. We need reasons to think that our senses convey accurate information about the world. Reasons that are extra-sensesual (I don’t want to use “sensual” since that has a double-meaning…). But our senses are our only means of acquiring information about the external world, and so we’re stuck with the instruments we’ve got. But they *are* instruments and filters. They do not give us the world-as-it-is, they give us the world-as-it-appears-to-us. Of course, we can construct other instruments that tell us more–like the discovery that colours are not “in the objects” (as it were), but are rather the result of light waves bouncing off of them and interacting with our eyes in certain ways.

We have better and worse reasons to accept the world-as-it-appears-to-me (note the use of “me” rather than “us” here, since we don’t have access to a collective brain, but must constitute some sense of world-as-it-appears-to-us through a combination of world-as-it-appears-to-me). But that’s all we have–better and worse reasons, not “knowledge,” strictly speaking.

So I’m basically on-board with Hume, but it doesn’t lead to things Rand or Peikoff thinks it does.

Libertarianism is broad and “lacks” foundations not because libertarians don’t hold foundational views that would exclude many others, but because the word “libertarian” applies to the conclusion of an argument, and not the argument itself. For the sake of an argument, you can define your terms in special ways for special purposes. But when you are using the ordinary notion of “libertarian” you are referring to people who share the belief that government should be massively restrained (for whatever reason–including consequentialist and deontological reasons).

(emphasis added)

I don’t care to rehash – yet again – why freedom cannot be defended without reference to a rationally-defensible metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical base. Those interested can read here, or here, or watch here:

You write:

The word “libertarian” does not function in the way you think it does. It does not represent a “closed” system. Neither, incidentally, is Objectivism (if you take the work of the Objectivist Center–now the Atlas Society–seriously).

First: a thing is what it is. That’s the law of identity. Ayn Rand’s philosophy is Ayn Rand‘s philosophy. Ayn Rand called her philosophy “Objectivism”. The various innovations that others want to pass off as her philosophy, by representing those innovations as “Objectivist”, are not a part of Ayn Rand’s philosophy and, so, are not Objectivism (whether those innovations are right or wrong). Objectivism is no more an “open system” than the concept “off” is open to including the concept “on”.

Second: I don’t take the work of David Kelley’s “Objectivist Centre-now the Atlas Society-seriously”. It tends to be associated with people who falsely call themselves Objectivists, and who speak at libertarian meetings. Related video:

You write:

How do you figure that the Liberty Summer Seminar is not helping the freedom movement?

Because it both implicitly and explicitly promotes libertarianism as being pro-freedom when it is not. Libertarianism, being a “big-tent” electoral strategy that intentionally denies the importance of metaphysical, epistemological and ethical issues to freedom, is anti-freedom in its effect.

Can you name a speaker, or anything, for that matter, that doesn’t serve the ends of promoting liberty?

Peter Jaworski, libertarianism, and the Liberty Summer Seminar.

Why is it so “much” of a mistake? [for an advocate of reason to attend or speak at the Liberty Summer Seminar]?

Because doing so helps give libertarianism an undeserved reputation for being pro-freedom when, in fact, it is anti-freedom. It is a mistake because those who are committed to reality and reason are pro-freedom.

Surely, surely there’s room for disagreement.

Of course, but not in the context of a pro-libertarian function. For example, I’m disagreeing with you right now.

And, besides, the LSS is not an advocacy event, it is an educational event.

Its purpose is to educate people…about libertarianism; or, at the very least, to educate in a way that implies libertarianism is a pro-freedom movement/strategy.

We always have plenty of objectivists who attend, and who are happy to participate in the discussion.

Believing you are an Objectivist is different from (a) being an Objectivist, and (b) acting as one. For example, I know anarchists who erroneously consider themselves to be Objectivists. Objectivists understand that to attend the Liberty Summer Seminar is to provide the sanction of the victim of altruism, irrationality, and unreality. A person truly committed to freedom looks at an invitation to the Liberty Summer Seminar, and shrugs.

It’s possible, you know, for people to be wrong about things, Paul.

You demonstrate that amply.

And to be wrong about them while not being evil or being willfully ignorant. Some of us just haven’t heard the right arguments (or we find the arguments presented to be wanting).

Tell me Peter. You are an intelligent guy. You have the capacity to read and understand Objectivism if you want to. You seem to imply that you have done the reading. What do you think about Hume and skepticism?

How do you figure that the Liberty Summer Seminar is not helping the freedom movement? Can you name a speaker, or anything, for that matter, that doesn’t serve the ends of promoting liberty? Why is it so “much” of a mistake?

Because we don’t just repeat what Ayn Rand said? Surely, surely there’s room for disagreement. And, besides, the LSS is not an advocacy event, it is an educational event. We intend, and do, discuss various views on liberty. We always have plenty of objectivists who attend, and who are happy to participate in the discussion.

It’s possible, you know, for people to be wrong about things, Paul. And to be wrong about them while not being evil or being willfully ignorant. Some of us just haven’t heard the right arguments (or we find the arguments presented to be wanting).

Those who deny the existence of existence; who deny that reason, and reason alone, is man’s means of obtaining knowledge; or who deny ones own life to be ones own highest value, rationality to be ones highest virtue, or ones own happiness to be ones highest purpose; are all people who will – in one instance or another – argue that government should not defend a person’s freedom rationally to pursue his own happiness. Yet libertarianism deliberately avoids taking a stand on metaphyics (reality), epistemology (reason), and ethics (rational egoism), in an attempt to gain the support of those who hold anti-reality, or anti-reason, or pro-altruistic philosophies; to gain the support those whose beliefs do not consistently support freedom.

Why give people the impression that I think a Hegelian’s arguments; or a mystic’s arguments, or an altruist’s arguments; are somehow worthy of serious consideration? They are not. But were I to stand amongst them; or to appear to be in league with them; it would be inferred that I think that freedom can be obtained when those committed to the facts of reality work with those who are committed to denying the facts of reality; that freedom can be obtained when those who regard divine revelation as a means of obtaining knowledge work with those who know reason alone to be effective in the discovery of knowledge; that freedom can be obtained when those who regard rational egoism to be pure evil work together with those who regard rational egoism to be the height of goodness; that the freedom rationally to pursue ones own happiness can be won by implicitly sanctioning altruism, irrationality, and the myth of the supernatural.

I’ve spoken/written numerous times as a guest of television programs; in newsmedia and magazine interviews; in major daily newspapers (including columns in the National Post and Toronto Star); in magazines (including the Fraser Forum, Consent, and the now defunct “Wealthy Boomer”), at Freedom Party dinners, conferences and media events; at private functions; at numerous all-candidates debates in 4 elections; on radio programs; on youtube (where I’m a partner); on my blog, etc.. I even spoke at the Liberty Summer Seminar before I understood how much of a mistake that was for one who wants a freer society. You can find much of it (though, clearly, not all of it) linked from my main web site: http://www.paulmckeever.com

Reason and reality conferences are held every year (see, for example, http://www.objectivistconferences.com ) though, clearly, there should be many more: if you want freedom, advocate reason.

You’ve told me that attendance at events like these implies agreement with the organizers and their principles. If that’s your view, what venues have you spoken at, and how many “reason and reality” conferences are there?