"Justice" Q&A: Trades Involve Two Evaluations of Justice/Injustice, Not One

At http://www.solopassion.com/node/4054#comments, Leonid, in response to my article “Justice” quoted an excerpt from the John Galt speech in Ayn Rand’s novel Atlas Shrugged, then wrote:

You say: ‘Though countless injustices have occurred in the history of humanity, and though great harm has been done by some against many, no individual has ever done an injustice to another’

Please explain why you say that in the view of countless evidences to the contrary?

My answer follows:

The key words in the statement (of mine) that you quote are: “to another”. I am not asserting that injustices are never done. I am asserting that they are done only to oneself, even though they frequently involve harm (not injustice, but harm) being done to others. I am asserting that, when it is true that “X unjustly harmed Y”, the following is true: X committed an injustice against himself, an effect of which was that Y was harmed.

If we determine justice in accordance with whether or not another person got from us what he deserved, then such a conception of justice has no relevance to a man when he is not interacting with others. Yet ethics, which asks “what should I do” should apply whether one is amongst others or alone: justice is an ethical concept, not a political one.

[An aside: the political concept that ensures every person gets what he deserves is not “justice” but “consent” (i.e., that all relations amongst individuals must be consensual). Consent is the appropriate political concept because the condition of consent is in ones own rational self-interest which, in turn, is the logical implication of the facts of reality and of man’s sole faculty for obtaining knowledge (i.e., reason).]

Consider a chain-smoker stranded on an island. He can survive only 3 days without water. He knows – for whatever reason – that he will be rescued exactly 7 days later. Imagine that, after swimming to shore from his shipwreck at sea, he has only enough physical energy either (a) to collect 5 days worth of water (and to consume it), or (b) to find and harvest some tobacco. He is thirsty when he arrives onshore. My submission is that it is just for him to choose to collect the water, but unjust for him to choose to locate and harvest the tobacco instead. The water is, in that situation, of greater value to him than the tobacco: if he collects water, he will live long enough to be rescued, but he will die if he chooses to collect the tobacco.

Now, let us add one person to our scenario: i.e., two chain-smokers (X and Y) swam to shore, both being thirsty. Let’s assume that X decided to collect water, but Y made the decision to collect tobacco. The morning of day 3 arrives around, and Y, who is very thirsty, asks X to trade all of his remaining water for all of Y’s remaining tobacco. It would be unjust for X to trade the water for the tobacco not because of what Y deserves, but for the following reason and for the following reason alone: were X to do the trade, X would be trading something that is a greater value to himself for something that is a lesser value to himself. Note that, in the exact same scenario, at the same point in time, it would be just for Y to trade his remaining tobacco for X’s remaining water even though X would die as a result of the exchange, because Y would have traded something that is a lesser value to himself for something that is a greater value to himself.

Had both X and Y been rational from the outset, both would have collected water, and both would have acted justly even though neither received anything from the other. Had both X and Y been irrational from the outset, and collected tobacco, both would have acted unjustly even though neither received anything from the other, and neither was denied or deprived anything by the other.

My point is that justice and injustice can be determined without reference to others. A just decision by X is a just decision whether that decision is to Y’s detriment or to Y’s benefit. An unjust decision by X is an unjust decision whether that decision is to Y’s detriment or to Y’s benefit. For the purpose of determining whether X’s decision was just or unjust, the effect of that decision on Y is a non-essential even if the injustice of one person typically results in harm to another person.

Consider that the fact that something is correlated does not mean that it is essential. The correlation between the freedom of trade in an economy and the overall wealth of the nation does not make the overall wealth of the nation an essential consideration in determining whether it is moral for there to be freedom of trade. It might be true that most injustices are correlated with harm being done to others, and that most just conduct is correlated with others receiving a benefit, and I suspect that, as a result of a widely-held belief that such is true, some philosophers have been drawn to make an erroneous conclusion that the deservedness of others is an essential consideration in determining whether conduct is just or unjust.

Let me relate this back to the passage you quote from Galt’s speech:

1. “Justice is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake the character of men as you cannot fake the character of nature, that you must judge all men as conscientiously as you judge inanimate objects, with the same respect for truth, with the same incorruptible vision, by as pure and as rational a process of identification—that every man must be judged for what he is…”

One must place a value on a person before one can determine what/who is more valuable to oneself, and what/who is less valuable to oneself, than that person. The passage above describes what must be done if one is to place a PROPER value on a person.

2. “…and treated accordingly…”

If you never trade a higher value for a lower one, the EFFECT will be that you will treat others “accordingly”.

3. “…that just as you do not pay a higher price for a rusty chunk of scrap than for a piece of shining metal, so you do not value a rotter above a hero…”

Rand is explaining that the value of a person must be assigned rationally. Nothing I’ve said disputes that.

4. “—that your moral appraisal is the coin paying men for their virtues or vices,…”

There are two parties (X and Y) to every trade. Consequently, for every transaction between X and Y, there is not one determination of justice or injustice, but two: one with respect to X, and another with respect to Y. Here are the four possible outcomes for a single transaction:

(a) UNJUST+UNJUST: X gives to Y something that is a higher value to X in exchange for something from Y that is a lesser value to X. That which Y gave to X was of a greater value to Y than was that which he received from X. In this outcome, X made an unjust decision, and so did Y.

(b) UNJUST+JUST: X gives to Y something that is a higher value to X in exchange for something from Y that is a lesser value to X. That which Y gave to X was of a lesser value to Y than was that which he received from X. In this outcome, X made an unjust decision, but Y made a just one.

(c) JUST+UNJUST: Y gives to X something that is a higher value to Y in exchange for something from X that is a lesser value to Y. That which X gave to Y was of a lesser value to X than was that which he received from Y. In this outcome, Y made an unjust decision, but X made a just one.

(d) JUST+JUST: X gives to Y something that is a lower value to X in exchange for something from Y that is a greater value to X. That which Y gave to X was of a lesser value to Y than that which he received from X. In this outcome, X made a just decision, and so did Y.

Rand’s philosophy neither states nor implies that the transaction is just or unjust. Rather, the justness of X’s and Y’s decision with respect to the same trade, has to be evaluated separately for each person. That Y somehow got what he “deserved from X” is irrelevant, even if one could show it to be true (and I don’t think one CAN show it to be true).

5. “…and this payment demands of you as scrupulous an honor as you bring to financial transactions—that to withhold your contempt from men’s vices is an act of moral counterfeiting, and to withhold your admiration from their virtues is an act of moral embezzlement—…”

In the passage above, X’s consideration for the trade is his “moral appraisal”. Y’s consideration, in exchange, is his “virtues or vices”. When X expresses an appraisal of Y, that expression will be considered by others when they evaluate X’s rationality and morality. If X (and rational others) know Y to be virtuous, but X expresses contempt for Y, then X has been unjust to himself for two reasons:

(a) Trading with a virtuous person can lead to the personal gain of value, and trading with a vicious person can result in a personal loss of value. Assuming that X will trade only with those whom he admires, condemning Y when Y is virtuous – and admiring Y if Y is vicious – will result in X trading with the vicious, but not with the virtuous. The result: X will engage in trades that cause him to lose value rather than to get it.

(b) Because rational people (perhaps including Y) will regard X to be irrational or vicious: X’s inappropriate expression of contempt has resulted in rational observers lowering their estimation of X’s value. X knew – or rationally should know – that to express admiration for Y (if Y is virtuous) will make X a person who is of value to rational persons, and that a false or erroneous expression of condemnation will make X a person who is of little or no value to rational persons. To a rational person, there is benefit in trading with rational people. For X to to be a person who is not valued by rational others is for X to cause rational people not to want to give to X that which X values more in exchange for that which X values less.

That is why Rand proceeds to speak of ones own moral currency: “…that to place any other concern higher than justice is to devaluate your moral currency…”

6. “…and defraud the good in favor of the evil, since only the good can lose by a default of justice and only the evil can profit—…”

To X, the greatest good is his own life, and the greatest evil is his own death. If X condemns Y though Y be virtuous, the results I discussed in 5, above, will occur. Trading with the vicious but not with the virtuous (see 5, above) will leave X less able to achieve happiness than he would have been were he to have conducted himself justly.

7. “…and that the bottom of the pit at the end of that road, the act of moral bankruptcy, is to punish men for their virtues and reward them for their vices…”

Bankruptcy results when one has no value to trade. Moral bankruptcy is the result of having devalued oneself (i.e., of having devalued to zero ones “moral currency”). Rand is saying that one completes the devaluation of oneself when one systematically and consistently punishes men for their virtues and rewards them for their vices.

8. “…that that is the collapse to full depravity, the Black Mass of the worship of death, the dedication of your consciousness to the destruction of existence.”

The devaluation of ones own moral currency results from trading that which is of higher value to oneself for that which is of lower value to oneself. Such trades are unjust to oneself. Moral depravity is moral bankruptcy, and such is the result of consistently making unjust decisions: of consistently trading that which is a higher value to oneself for that which is of lower value to oneself. To consciously and consistently make unjust trades is to worship death because to consciously and consistently make unjust trades is to consciously attempt to leave oneself without the value needed to live: it is consciously to sentence oneself to death and consciously to pursue execution of the sentence.